Federal financial-crimes police agency. The Liberal government announced 2026-04-30 a new federal police agency dedicated to financial crimes. cbc.ca — "Liberals are pitching a brand new police agency for financial crimes. How would that work?"
Why it goes on this scorecard: a new oversight surface is a new accountability bet. The mandate, the reporting structure, the appointment power, and the enforcement record will become this row's three columns once the agency is constituted. Until then the entry is "announced — not yet operational" and is tracked here so the dossier records what was promised against what is delivered.
Three open questions: (1) does the agency have prosecutorial power or only investigative? (2) does it report through the Solicitor General / Public Safety, or under independent statutory reporting? (3) what is the timeline from announcement to first investigation closed? Each answers will be added to the scorecard row when the supporting primary source publishes.
Toronto Police corruption probe. A Toronto Police Service officer at the centre of a corruption probe was denied bail again on appeal. Reported 2026-04-29 via globalnews.ca — "Toronto police officer at centre of corruption probe denied bail again". The corruption-and-bribery keywords on the Global News piece bring the case onto the scorecard's law-enforcement-oversight row. Tracking until charge resolution.
$250M PrescribeIT — AG investigation REQUEST. Conservatives formally asked the Auditor General to investigate the $250M PrescribeIT federal e-prescribing program. Reported 2026-04-28 via cbc.ca — "Conservatives call on auditor general to investigate $250M PrescribeIT program". This is a request, not an opened audit — the AG decides whether to act. Tracking forward: did the AG accept the referral? If yes, what is the audit scope? If no, what was the stated reason?
| Institution | Can Investigate? | Can Prosecute? | Enforcement Record | Dossier |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethics Commissioner | YES | NO | 0 criminal consequences | → |
| RCMP (political crimes) | YES | YES (via Crown) | 0 prosecutions (8 instances) | → |
| MPCC (military police) | YES | NO | 0 senior convictions | → |
| Procurement Ombudsman | YES | NO | Documents fraud, cannot charge | → |
| NSIRA (intelligence) | YES (after fact) | NO | Reviews, cannot direct | → |
| CEIPP (elections) | Monitor only | NO | 11 ridings, no intervention | → |
| Information Commissioner | YES | NO | Cannot compel cabinet docs | → |
| PSIC (whistleblower) | YES | NO | Rarely finds wrongdoing | → |
| Auditor General | YES | NO | Documents waste, cannot charge | → |
| VISP / VIAP (vaccine injury) | Claims intake only | NO | 7% approval (234 of 3,317); $33.7M admin vs $16.9M paid | → |
| Ontario Superior Court (Hartman) | N/A (plaintiff must bring claim) | NO — struck Anns/Cooper claim | "No private law duty of care" (J. Antoniani, 3/2025) | → |
| Bill C-70 Registry | Registration-based | YES (RCMP) | 0 registrations, 0 charges | → |
10 oversight bodies. 10 can investigate. 2 can prosecute. 0 have enforced.
The accountability architecture is structurally designed for review without enforcement. Every body can document. None can compel. The result is 185+ pages of documented evidence on this site — and zero criminal consequences for the political class. This is why s.504 private prosecution exists: because the state cannot be relied upon to prosecute itself.
The Full Investigation