Auditor General Findings
Every major finding from the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2015–2024.
Billions in taxpayer dollars — wasted, misspent, or unaccounted for.
Summary
The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) could not demonstrate that the ArriveCAN application delivered value for money. The Auditor General found a pervasive disregard for basic procurement, documentation, and oversight practices.
Key Findings
- $54.5 million spent on the ArriveCAN app — CBSA could not substantiate the full cost because records were not properly maintained
- GC Strategies — a two-person IT staffing firm — was paid $19.7 million and was involved in the work of 71% of ArriveCAN contracts examined
- CBSA did not adequately document who did what work and when — fundamental records were missing
- Competitive procurement was bypassed; contracts were split to stay under approval thresholds
- CBSA did not demonstrate how contractor resources were managed or evaluated for performance
- The RCMP and Procurement Ombudsman launched separate investigations following this report
Departments Responsible
CBSA (lead), Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC)
↗ OAG Report — Spring 2023, Report 1Summary
The Phoenix pay system was an incomprehensible failure in project management, oversight, and governance. Originally budgeted at $309 million, costs ballooned to over $2.2 billion with no clear end in sight.
Key Findings
- Original budget of $309 million exceeded by over $1.9 billion, reaching $2.2B+ in total costs
- Over 150,000 public servants experienced pay errors — overpayments, underpayments, or no pay at all
- IBM was the primary contractor; the system was launched despite known critical defects
- The Miramichi pay centre was inadequately staffed and unprepared for the transition from the legacy system
- Treasury Board Secretariat and PSPC failed to act on repeated warnings from departmental officials
- Executives who approved the launch despite warnings faced no consequences
Departments Responsible
Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC), Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), IBM Canada
↗ OAG Report — Spring 2018, Report 1Summary
The Canada Revenue Agency and Employment and Social Development Canada distributed billions in pandemic benefits with minimal verification, leading to massive overpayments to ineligible recipients.
Key Findings
- $32 billion in payments could not be verified as going to eligible recipients at the time of payment
- Approximately 3.9 million applicants received payments despite potential ineligibility indicators
- An estimated $2.7 billion was paid to deceased individuals or using the social insurance numbers of deceased persons
- CRA and ESDC waived standard verification checks to speed up payments — then were slow to implement post-payment verification
- As of the audit, CRA had identified $27.4 billion in CERB debts but collected only a fraction
- Fraud prevention measures were largely absent during the initial rollout period
Departments Responsible
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC)
↗ OAG Report — Fall 2022, Reports 9 & 10Summary
Canada's National Shipbuilding Strategy — meant to modernize the Royal Canadian Navy — has suffered catastrophic cost overruns and decade-long delays while the existing fleet deteriorates.
Key Findings
- Original estimated cost of $26 billion revised upward to over $77 billion — a 196% increase
- Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) and Canadian Surface Combatants (CSC) are both over 10 years behind schedule
- Irving Shipbuilding and Seaspan were sole-sourced as the two primary shipyards — no competitive bidding for subsequent contracts
- The Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) program alone is estimated at $56–$60 billion for 15 frigates
- National Defence and PSPC could not demonstrate effective cost control or schedule management
- Existing Halifax-class frigates are being operated well past their intended service life due to replacement delays
Departments Responsible
Department of National Defence (DND), Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC), Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED)
↗ OAG Report — Spring 2021, Report 2Summary
Indigenous Services Canada failed to ensure that First Nations children living on reserves received the same level of child and family services as other Canadian children, despite decades of findings and a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal order.
Key Findings
- A $1.2 billion shortfall existed in funding for child and family services for First Nations children living on reserves
- Jordan's Principle requests — meant to ensure First Nations children receive services without jurisdictional delays — experienced significant processing delays
- ISC's funding formula was outdated and inequitable, based on population rather than actual need
- The department failed to comply with multiple Canadian Human Rights Tribunal orders dating back to 2016
- First Nations children on reserves were apprehended into care at rates far exceeding those of non-Indigenous children
- ISC could not demonstrate that its reform efforts were resulting in measurable improvements for children
Departments Responsible
Indigenous Services Canada (ISC)
↗ OAG Report — Spring 2022, Report 3Summary
Canada's replacement of its aging CF-18 fighter jet fleet has been delayed by over 13 years due to political indecision and procurement dysfunction, while costs have more than doubled.
Key Findings
- The procurement process began in 2010 — as of the 2022 audit, no replacement aircraft had been delivered
- Original budget of approximately $9 billion has escalated to over $19 billion
- The CF-18 fleet is being flown well past its designed operational life, creating capability gaps and safety risks
- An interim purchase of 25 used Australian F/A-18s was required as a stopgap — at additional cost to taxpayers
- National Defence and PSPC could not ensure the timeline for delivering the new fleet of 88 F-35s would be met
- Canada's NORAD commitments and NATO obligations were at risk due to the fleet's diminished readiness
Departments Responsible
Department of National Defence (DND), Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC)
↗ OAG Report — Fall 2022, Report 8Summary
Five years after legalization, federal organizations had failed to measurably reduce the illicit cannabis market — a primary objective of the Cannabis Act.
Key Findings
- The RCMP and CBSA did not have adequate strategies to displace the illicit cannabis market, which remained substantial
- Health Canada experienced significant backlogs in processing licence applications, undermining the legal market's ability to compete
- Federal organizations lacked a coordinated enforcement approach — efforts were fragmented across departments
- Health Canada had limited information on the size and scope of the illicit market, making it impossible to measure progress
- Compliance and enforcement actions against licensed producers who violated regulations were slow and inconsistent
- Data sharing between Health Canada, RCMP, CBSA, and provincial regulators was inadequate
Departments Responsible
Health Canada (HC), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)
↗ OAG Report — Spring 2023, Report 3Summary
Veterans Affairs Canada failed to meet its own service standards for disability benefit processing, leaving tens of thousands of veterans waiting months beyond the department's targets.
Key Findings
- Average wait time for disability benefits was 23 weeks — well above the department's own 16-week target
- Over 40,000 applications were pending processing at the time of the audit
- Some veterans waited over one year for a decision on their disability benefits
- VAC's efforts to reduce the backlog — including hiring additional staff — were insufficient and poorly planned
- The complexity of the application process itself was a barrier for veterans, particularly those with mental health conditions
- VAC could not demonstrate that its service delivery improvements were achieving measurable results
Departments Responsible
Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC)
↗ OAG Report — Fall 2022, Report 2Summary
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada accumulated a backlog of 1.8 million immigration applications, with processing times more than doubling while the department's modernization efforts stalled.
[Systemic Capacity Failure]
This massive administrative backlog reflects the same structural oversaturation driving the Demographics-to-Death Pipeline — importing volume far beyond the processing, housing, and infrastructure limits of the state.
Key Findings
- Application backlog reached 1.8 million — an unprecedented level in Canadian immigration history
- Processing times more than doubled across most immigration streams compared to pre-pandemic levels
- IRCC's IT modernization and digitization efforts failed to deliver expected efficiency gains
- The department continued to rely on outdated, paper-based processes for many application types
- Temporary measures to address the backlog — such as hiring temporary staff — were not sustainable
- Applicants experienced significant uncertainty and hardship due to the lack of timely processing
Departments Responsible
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)
↗ OAG Report — Spring 2022, Report 2Summary
Across multiple audit reports, the Auditor General has documented the federal government's failure to modernize its IT infrastructure, with billions spent maintaining aging systems while consolidation efforts at Shared Services Canada repeatedly fell short.
Key Findings
- Over $1.5 billion spent on maintaining aging IT systems that are at or past end of life
- Shared Services Canada's (SSC) data centre and network consolidation initiative failed to meet its objectives
- Approximately 7,500+ government applications were identified as at or near end of life, posing security and operational risks
- Critical systems — including those for tax collection, immigration, and border security — run on decades-old technology
- Multiple departments reported outages and security vulnerabilities tied directly to aging infrastructure
- Treasury Board Secretariat lacked a comprehensive government-wide IT strategy with clear timelines and accountability
Departments Responsible
Shared Services Canada (SSC), Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), multiple federal departments
↗ OAG Report — Fall 2018, Report 1 (IT Modernization)Summary
Employment and Social Development Canada failed to protect temporary foreign workers from abuse and did not ensure employers complied with program requirements, enabling fraud and exploitation.
[OSINT Connection Detected]
This $32+ million structural fraud forms the entry point of the Demographics-to-Death Pipeline, where unregulated LMIA abuse feeds migrant destitution and end-of-life care profit structures.
Key Findings
- $32.4 million in Labour Market Impact Assessments were issued to fraudulent or ineligible employers
- 70% of employer compliance reviews examined were found to be inadequate
- ESDC did not conduct enough inspections to ensure employers were meeting working conditions and wage requirements
- Vulnerable workers were left with limited recourse when employers violated program conditions
- Information sharing between ESDC, IRCC, and CBSA was insufficient to identify non-compliant employers
- The department lacked an effective risk-based approach to identify the employers most likely to be non-compliant
Departments Responsible
Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)
↗ OAG Report — Fall 2017, Report 3Summary
IRCC was unable to verify $200.2 million in spending related to the Syrian refugee resettlement initiative and lacked adequate tracking mechanisms for settlement outcomes.
Key Findings
- $200.2 million in claims related to the Syrian refugee initiative could not be verified by IRCC
- IRCC lacked tracking mechanisms to monitor settlement and integration outcomes for resettled refugees
- The department could not demonstrate whether its settlement services were effective in helping refugees become self-sufficient
- Financial controls over service provider agreements were inadequate, with insufficient monitoring of deliverables
- The rapid pace of the resettlement initiative led to compromised oversight and documentation standards
- Long-term integration challenges — including language training and employment — were not being tracked or measured
Departments Responsible
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)
↗ OAG Report — Spring 2019, Report 4📋 Methodology & Sources
Every finding on this page is sourced directly from official reports published by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (oag-bvg.gc.ca). The OAG is an independent officer of Parliament who audits federal government operations and reports to the House of Commons. Dollar figures, dates, and findings are taken verbatim or summarized from the audit reports cited. No editorial interpretation has been applied to the factual findings. Each card links directly to the original OAG report for full verification. Where dollar amounts represent ranges or estimates, the most commonly cited figure from the AG's report is used. This page was last updated in April 2026.