Political-Business Influence Graph

Structural finding

The Canadian federal accountability system distinguishes between lobbying registration (Commissioner of Lobbying) and post-cabinet activity (Lobbying Act 5-year cooling-off for designated public office-holders).

But there is no oversight body whose designated scope is the aggregate revolving-door pattern as a whole. Each Brison-to-BMO, Bains-to-CIBC, McKenna-to-TD, Butts-to-Eurasia, MacNaughton-to-Palantir transition is individually reviewed only to the narrow extent each person personally registered to lobby (or, in the MacNaughton case, failed to register, which produced the 2021 Commissioner of Lobbying finding). But the cluster itself — the pattern of federal-executive-to-major-bank / federal-ambassador-to-major-tech-contractor transitions — is nobody's jurisdiction.

This is the same structural gap the state-of-investigation and family-connections pages identify: the Canadian federal accountability system distributes review across independent bodies so thoroughly that no body has jurisdiction over cross-axis, cross-relationship, or cross-institutional patterns.